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Abstract—Honeypots are used in IT Security to detect and
gather information about ongoing intrusions, e.g., by document-
ing the approach of an attacker. Honeypots do so by presenting
an interactive system that seems just like a valid application
to an attacker. One of the main design goals of honeypots is
to stay unnoticed by attackers as long as possible. The longer
the intruder interacts with the honeypot, the more valuable
information about the attack can be collected. Of course, another
main goal of honeypots is to not open new vulnerabilities that
attackers can exploit. Thus, it is necessary to harden the honeypot
and the surrounding environment. This paper presents Apate,
a Linux Kernel Module (LKM) that is able to log, block and
manipulate system calls based on preconfigurable conditions
like Process ID (PID), User Id (UID), and many more. Apate
can be used to build and harden High Interaction Honeypots.
Apate can be configured using an integrated high level language.
Thus, Apate is an important and easy to use building block for
upcoming High Interaction Honeypots.
Index Terms—Honeypot; Intrusion Detection; Linux Kernel;
Rule Engine
I. INTRODUCTION
Honeypots are well known tools for Intrusion Detection
and IT Security research. Usually, honeypots fall into one of
two classes: Low Interaction Honeypots and High Interaction
Honeypots. A Low Interaction Honeypot simulates attackable
services, systems, or environments whereas a High Interaction
Honeypot [1][2] offers a real exploitable service, system, or
environment. As in most cases a honeypot is not a productive
system, every activity on a honeypot is either unintended use
or an attack.
When deploying a High Interaction Honeypot, it is nec-
essary to harden the honeypot to avoid attackers gaining
unintended control of the system running the honeypot. A
High Interaction Honeypot should by definition be exploitable,
but it should prevent annoying or harmful operations on the
honeypot system. Another important requirement for High
Interaction Honeypot is to log as much information as possible
about the state of the system and about ongoing intrusions.
Therefore, a High Interaction Honeypot needs a highly flexible
way to decide which information should be logged and which
should not. Apate offers such a flexible way, using a high-level
language for configuration. Also, it should be possible to log
information on a as fine granular level as possible. Apate offers
a logging on system call level. Manipulation of system calls,
depending on user interaction or the system environment, is
necessary to provide High Interaction Honeypot functionali-
ties. This allows the honeypot provider to present different
environments depending on PID, UID (and many more), or
system call parameters. For example, the High Interaction
Honeypot provider is able to present one file structure to PID
42 and a completely different file structure to PID 43. This
manipulation can be used to decoy an attacker. Furthermore,
it can also be used to suppress harmful actions. The honeypot
admin is able to prevent execution of system call. Blocking
a system call can be done by really blocking (not calling the
real system call), or in a more sophisticated way. At last, it
is necessary that High Interaction Honeypot components (like
the proposed LKM) should be hard to detect for intruders.
This requirement calls for sophisticated technologies, already
known from rootkits. For productive use, it is necessary that a
High Interaction Honeypot module has only low computational
overhead. An attacker should not be able to detect a High
Interaction Honeypot by observing performance leaks.
Apate is a Linux Kernel module that fulfills all requirements
mentioned above. Hence, it is an important building block for
High Interaction Honeypots.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
provides an overview on related work. Section III describes
the design and implementation of Apate in detail. Section IV
shows the evaluation of Apate. Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A well known honeypot tool, based on LKM for 2.6 Linux
Kernel, is Sebek [3][4]. Sebek is primarly used for logging
purposes in High Interaction Honeypot. Thus, it provides
several methods for detailed logging (like logging via network
or GUI). In [5][6], ways to detect Sebek are described. Sebek
does not provide the possibility to manipulate system calls,
hence it does not offer such a fine-grain information logging
as provided by Apate.
Another approach for monitoring systems is to use virtual
machine introspection and system view reconstruction. For
example, [7], [8], and [9] use this approach. Introspection
realized on hardware level of the virtual machines offers
a stealthier approach then Apate. However, Apate provides
additional means to manipulate the behavior of system calls,
which are not supported by [7], [8], and [9], hence Apate is
superior to these approaches.
SELinux [10] is a well known tool for inserting hooks
at different locations inside the kernel. Such an approach
provides access control for critical kernel routines. SELinux
can be controlled on a very fine granular level with an
embedded configuration language. Although SELinux is very
useful in hardening a kernel, it is not designed for honeypot
purposes. Especially, it lacks in the possibility to decoy the
attacker using “wrong” information.
Grsecurity [11] with PAX [12] is similar to Apate. However,
it greatly differs in ease of deployment and ease of configura-
tion [13]. It also lacks in the possibility to decoy the attacker
with “wrong” informations.
In conclusion, non of the mentioned related work fulfills all
requirements listed in Section I. Apate fulfills all requirements,
hence is a useful building block for upcoming High Interaction
Honeypots.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Apate intercepts system calls and allows to execute custom
code in these calls. Figure 1 shows the interception strategy
of Apate.
Call Syscall
Interception (Hook)
Original Syscall
Interception (Hook)
Rules
Return
Fig. 1. interception strategy of Apate
Apate does not manipulate the syscall table to prevent
detection (see Subsection III-D for details). Apate intercepts
the syscall within the syscall target, i.e., the real syscall address
is called but Apate jumps immediately to the interception
routine (after consuming some decoy assembler code). The
hook decides on the action to invoke, based on the rules for this
system call. Within this action, it is able to manipulate, block
and/or log a system call. The following hooks are implemented
in Apate :
• sys open, sys close, sys open
• sys read, sys write, sys unlink
• sys execve
• sys getpid, sys getuid
• sys mkdir, sys rmdir
• sys getdents
This paper focuses on the usage of system calls that are
related to File IO and execution control as these system calls
are usefull for hardening High Interaction Honeypots.
A. Configuration
Apate can be configured in a very flexible way as can be
seen in Figure 2. The configuration file rules.apate, written in
a high level language (see sectionIII-B for details), gets com-
piled by the Apate compiler, resulting in the file apaterules.c.
Together with the original source code, the compiler generates
the Apate LKM. The resulting LKM can be loaded into kernel
rules.apate
Apate Compiler
apaterules.c Apate sources (*.c)
gcc
Apate LKM (apate.ko)
Fig. 2. Configuration workflow of Apate
with common insmod util. Once loaded, the ruleset is active.
The configuration consists of rulesets. A ruleset is an
ordered list of rules. A system call gets intercepted when one
or more rules match. One system call can have more than one
matching rule with different decision parameters. There are
three major types of decision parameters:
• Parameters that are system call independent like PID,
UID, SSID (in fact every variable from struct task struct
[14] could be used for conditions).
• Parameters that are dependent to the specified system call.
Often, these are function parameters like paths.
• Parameters that are defined by functions. This decision
parameter allows to build reactive systems. For example,
one can define a condition which reads some file, when-
ever the file contains a keyword the condition could be
true.
Rules are defined as stated below:
Let be true = 1 and false = 0. Let c(a, b) be a condition
such that:
C : A×B → {0, 1}
(a, b) 7→ c(a, b)
(1)
, where a ∈ A and b ∈ B are two parameters, which are used
by c() for the calculation of the condition. The parameters are
further called decision parameters. For example, a decision
parameter could be the path of the system call sys open()
and the related condition is if (param[0] == “/etc/passwd”)
? 1 : 0 where a = param[0] and b = “/etc/passwd′′ .
This rule matches system calls trying to get access to the file
“/etc/passwd′′
Let cb(d, e, f) be a condition block. A condition block
calculates the result of conditions or other conditionblocks
with AND or OR. A condition block uses two parameters d
and e and an operator f . d and e can be the result of any
c(a, b) or another cb(d, e, f).
CB is the set of all possible condition blocks:
CB : {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {AND,OR} → {0, 1}
(d, e, f) 7→ cb(d, e, f)
(2)
Further, the set of all conditions and condition blocks is AC
such that
AC = C ∪ CB (3)
For cb(d, e, f) let d, e ∈ AC and f ∈ {2, 4}. When f = 2
the operator AND will be used. When f = 4 the operator OR
will be used. c∗(a, b) is a condition that returns always true.
The second parameter in the conditionblock can be neutralised
with cb(d, c∗(0, 0), 2)
This leads to the definition
cb(d, e, f) =
{
1 if (d+ e) ∗ f ≥ 4
0 other
(4)
This definition makes it possible to group different condi-
tions and to be aware of precedences.
Let A be the set of atomic actions. An atomic action is
a function that provides only one single functionality. For
example, an atomic action can be the redirection of a system
call. An action a ∈ A falls in one of three groups:
• Manipulating actions
• Logging actions
• Blocking or emergency exit actions
Let AS be an orderd list of actions. The index function i(x)
assigns an index to each element x ∈ AS, hence
AS = {x ∈ AS|0 < i(x− 1) < i(x)} (5)
Let AAS be the lists of all actions. A rule rg,h consists of
one condition block g ∈ CB and an action set h ∈ ASS. Let
R be the set of all rules. Whenever the condition block returns
1, the action set h is started.
Let RS be a list of sorted rules (RS ∈ R). Each element
of RS has a flag fl. A flag is defined as
fl ∈ {exit = 1,¬exit = 0} (6)
When a system call gets called, all rules in RS are calculated
beginning with the first rule in RS and until a rule is in state
true and fl = 1.
Using the definitions above, a highly configurable system
could be build. Including some basic predefined conditions
enhances convenience, e.g., equality checks for integer, floats
or strings.
B. Configuration High Level Language
The configuration language implements two main require-
ments: first, the configuration language should be flexible,
including the ability to reuse patterns, store variables, calculate
with operators, embed external functions, define functions, and
use decision statements. This allows to use the language to
describe even very complex scenarios. Second, the configu-
ration language should provide a transparent way to define
rules, related to honeypots (or in scope of this paper to control
and manipulate system calls). To deal with these requirements,
the Apate language combines concepts known from functional
programming (in this case Haskell [15]) with a concept well
known from packet filter configuration (in this case pf [16]).
This Section gives a brief introduction to the important parts
of the language. For the sake of clarity, some convenience
features of the Apate language ( e.g., embedded C, self defined
functions, loops) are omitted.
Listing 3 shows some example source code for the Apate
language.
d e f i n e c1 , c2 , c3 as c o n d i t i o n
d e f i n e r1 , r2 as r u l e
d e f i n e a1 , a2 as a c t i o n
d e f i n e cb1 as c o n d i t i o n b l o c k
d e f i n e r c 1 as r u l e c h a i n
d e f i n e sy1 as s y s c a l l
l e t c1 be t e s t f o r p n a m e
l e t c2 be t e s t f o r p a r a m
l e t c3 be t e s t f o r u i d
l e t a1 be m a n i p u l a t e p a ra m
l e t a2 be l o g
l e t sy1 be sy s o p en
l e t cb1 be { ( c1 ( ” mysql ” ) && c2 ( 0 ; ” / v a r /\
l i b / mysql / ∗ ” ) ) }
l e t r 1 be {cb1−>a1 ( 0 ; ” / v a r / l i b / mysql /∗ ” \
; ” / honey / mysql / ” ) }
l e t r 2 be {{ c3 (”>” ,0)}−>a2 ( ) }
l e t r c 1 be { r2 , : r 1 } / / : d e f i n e s e x i t
b in d r c 1 t o sy1
Fig. 3. Example Sourcecode Apate language
The first block with the define statements binds variables
to different types (like condition, rules, or functions). The code
block with the let statements points these variables to values
or functions. In this case, it defines 3 conditions (c1,c2,c3).
c1 will test the actual process name against another string.
c2 tests if a param of the actual syscall is equal to a given
value. c3 tests if the actual uid is equal to a given value.
a1,a2 are actions. a1 manipulates a parameter of the actual
system call. a2 logs a system call. The variable cb1 represents
a condition block. Its let assignment also shows that it is
possible to write nested variable assignements. In this case, the
conditions c1,c2 are combined with && (AND). In the same
line, the conditions c1,c2 gets assigned with parameters. In
this case the condition c1 checks if the current parent process
is the mysql-Process. c2 checks if the first parameter (0)
of the current system call is equal to /var/lib/mysql/* . The
asterisk describes a wildcard function. The rule assignment
for let r1 be... binds a conditionblock to an action. In
this case, it means whenever the conditionblock returns true
the action a1 rewrites the first param of the current system
call. It replaces /var/lib/mysql with /honey/mysql . The rule
r2 logs the current system call whenever the current UID
is greater than 0. A ruleset (rulechain) rc1 is assigned with
r2,r1. The r1 rule is also assigned as exit rule (..:r1..).
When this rule fires, no further rules will be called. In the last
line, the rule chain rc1 is bound to the system call sys open.
In conclusion, when the system call sys open gets called,
the parent process is the mysql process and the system call
parameter (in this case the path which should be opened)
begins with /var/lib/mysql/*, this syscall gets manipulated and
the syscall will open a file under /honey/mysql/... . The second
rule means that every call for sys open will be logged, except
when the root user calls this system call.
C. Manipulation of System Calls
If a rule matches, the corresponding action chain gets called
to manipulate the original system call. An action chain has a
length l with 1 ≤ l < n.
Figure 4 shows an example for the manipulation strategy.
Functions prefixed with f are actions.
Syscall entry dispatcher
f log
f change path
f call origSyscall return
Fig. 4. Conceptual Manipulation Strategy
The dispatcher represents the rule engine, deciding which
action chain should be used. In this example the first action
logs the system call. The next action manipulates some pa-
rameter like a path or anything else. The f call orig calls
the original system call with the manipulated parameter. The
result gets returned to the callee.
Technically, one action is a function that consumes all
system call parameters, including the current struct task struct
and a pointer to the syscall result variable. Each function
returns an Integer, indicating wether the function call has been
successful or not. Whenever a function returns an error, the
action chain gets disrupted and an error routine is called.
Finally, the hook returns the syscall result. In case of an error
the system call returns a system call dependent error.
D. Hiding Hooks and LKM
An attacker should not be able to detect Apate, otherwise
Apate would not be suitable for High Interaction Honeypots.
As hiding software in all use cases is very difficult, Apate
must at least hide itself until the effort of detection of Apate
is unreasonable high for an intruder. This requires to define
which effort is unreasonable high for an attacker and which
is not. The following actions are defined as reasonable for an
attacker, hence should be prevented:
• Testing for module presence with standard utils like
lsmod,modinfo,... or misleading errors when using in-
smod and similar tools
• Testing for presence of module in /proc/module and
/sys/module
• Testing for presence of Apate related logfiles, configura-
tions, and other artifacts
To hide Apate, it is necessary to remove the module from
the module list. Simplified, all modules are represented in a
global linked list. By using
list_del_init(&__this_module.list);
the module is removed and therefore invisible. To hide from
the /sys/module Apate uses
kobject_del(&THIS_MODULE->mkobj.kobj);
to remove itself from this representation. With these modi-
fication, the module is invisible to standard utils (they use
/proc/module ) and in /sys/module . These technologies are
also well known rootkit technologies see for example [18][19].
Apate does not use any configuration files beyond the con-
figured rules. The high level language should be deleted by the
honeypot admin after its compilation into Apate. Hence, Apate
cannot be identified by an attacker looking for configuration
files.
Apate is used to cloak logfiles: predefined rules in Apate
prevent all users to see, read, or write Apate logfiles. To gain
access to the logfile, a system administrator need to restart the
host system without the honeypot.
To detect a hook, an intruder needs to analyze physical
memory. Apate makes it hard to load a new module into the
kernel. It prevents to load another kernel module by overriding
the flag that controls the module loading ability. Beyond the
possibilities of Apate, the honeypot admin can harden the host
system to ensure that this dumping has a high effort for an
intruder.
Apate has different opportunities to insert hooks into system
calls. By default, Apate changes the function pointer in the sys-
tem call table. This is sufficient as long as the intruder has no
possibility to compare the original table with the hooked table.
If this is not enough protection, the admin can decide to harden
the system with some anti-rootkit technologies. This makes it
impossible for Apate to overwrite the jump points. Figure 5
shows the alternative hooking technology. This technology is
somefunction()
...instructions...
call syscall xyz
...instructions...
syscall xyz()
push ebp
fld qword [addr]
fistp dword [esp]
retn
...instructions...
syscall hook()
...instructions...
call trampoline
...instructions...
trampoline()
old instr #1
old instr #2
old instr #3
jmp syscall xyz + n
Fig. 5. Hooking using a so-called trampoline
well known from Windows and Linux rootkits. During the
hooking process, Apate stores the first n bytes of the target
system call function. The stored commands will be copied
to a trampoline function. Instead of the original commands,
Apate injects a jump operation. This lets the process jump into
the hooking function immediately after entering the original
system call function. Whenever the hooking function calls
the original system call, it calls the trampoline function. The
original code is executed, then the trampoline function lets
the process jump into the original function with an offset of
n bytes. The trampoline is a feature to obfuscate the hook
for rootkit detection tools and uses live patching technologies.
Thus, it can be detected with core dump disassembling. This
is out of scope of this paper as it is assumed that the effort to
detect the honeypot with disassembling tools is too high.
IV. EVALUATION
There are three major goals for Apate. The first goal
is to provide a highly flexible configuration. Although the
proposed configuration system works well and is suitable for
High Interaction Honeypots, it must be ensured that every
possible combination of rulesets and actions can be described.
This means that the configuration language must be turing
complete. For this, it is determined that an action a is able
to decide which rule from the ruleset should be invoked next.
This means it can jump to any other rule from a given ruleset.
It is also determined that Apate has an array (in this case an
impossible array with infinite indices which can hold any other
type (like actions, rules, other defined variables or anything
else)). Technically, Apate has a register and a stack. Last, it is
determined that an action is able to fill or read any index of this
array. Together with actions for calculations and conditions
for jump decisions, the system is turing complete. In fact any
action is just a C-Function and the define statement creates
variables.
The second goal is to provide a system which achieves a
suitable level of stealthiness. As described in Subsection III-D,
the system hides itself from common util tools like lsmod,
modinfo, modprobe, insmod . Apate is also not available in
/proc/module or /sys/module . To test for presence in any
logfile a simple grep command with typical signatures for
Apate (Simplified each log entry or configuration includes the
string “apate”, thus it is easy to detect it) is fired on the full
system. However with proper rules these log entries are not
visible by standard system commands.
The third goal is that Apate should be efficient. Performance
tests should assure that Apate is able to serve under productive
usage scenarios. The most important performance factor is the
overhead of logging. To evaluate the performance of Apate in a
productive scenario, the execution time of sys open , sys write
,sys read , and sys close are measured. The sys open and
sys close get called just once a file is opened or closed. The
sys write and sys read get called more often (under the
condition that heavy writing will be done on the system). Thus,
the test pattern concentrates on sys write and sys read . For
the performance evaluation, data is copied from one file to
another using increasing file lengths. This will be done for
100 times for each file size. The source file is generated on
the fly from /dev/random before each copy command. After
each successful copy command the target file is deleted. A
Gentoo 64 Bit system with 32 GB Ram and 16 Cores is used
for all performance tests. The kernel is optimized by disabling
unnecessary drivers and by enabling some debugging flags.
One source file is generated for each size with random bits
and a length of l(file) bytes. Let the size of the file be:
0 < l < 1, 000, 000, 000 (7)
and
ln(file) =


ln−1 + 1 if ln < 1, 000, 000
ln−1 + 1, 000 if 1, 000, 000 ≤ ln
∧ln < 100, 000, 000
ln−2 + 1, 000, 000 if 100, 000, 000≤ ln
∧ln ≤ 1, 000, 000, 000
(8)
Four different settings were tested.
The first setting (m1) is used as reference setting. It does
not use any interception.
The second setting, m2, uses only one rule which always
returns true. The related action set calls the origin system call
and logs this action. This is the shortest way in Apate to
provide logging functionality. This testing is used to evaluate
the logging overhead of Apate.
TABLE I. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
Measurement m1 m2 m3 m4
Measurements 110,800 110,800 110,800 110,800
Unique Filesizes 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108
sd(runtime sec) 0.1066 0.2421 0.2452
var(runtime sec) 0.0114 0.0586 0.0601
iqr(runtime sec) 0.0010 0.0026 0.0023
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Fig. 6. Relation between runtime/filesize/rules sys open
The third and fourth setting, m3 and m4, evaluate the
influence of rules. Each rule consists of 50 conditions with
{c0, c1, . . . , c50} where each condition is combined with an
and statement. The last condition returns false. Each test
uses 50 rules. The last condition in rule number 50 (last rule)
returns true. Overall, each system call passes 2500 conditions.
This triggers an action set that will call the original system
call (m3 and m4) and then logs this action (only m4).
Table I shows the results of the performance evaluation. The
sd -row shows the standard deviation, var shows the variance,
and Iqr shows the interquartile range.
Figure 6 shows the correlation between file size and runtime.
For every curve the median of the measured runtimes for each
unique file size is connected with a line. The m1 curve shows
the reference setting. The m2 curve shows that the logging
component has a big influence on performance. Each syscall
and its values were logged. Each log was sent to another
server using UDP. Gentoo uses a buffer with 65,365 Byte. To
copy a file with one Gigabyte it needs 32,720 syscalls. This
explains the overhead of m2 and m4. The m3 curve shows that
the rule engine works with just a small overhead when only
conditions get processed. For one measurement with a file size
of one Gigabyte, the engine processed 81,800,000 conditions.
However, to copy a file with less than 65,365 Byte only 4
syscalls are passed and therefore only 10,000 conditions gets
processed.
In conclusion, these measurements shows that it is possible
to build a syscall interception framework which is able to
provide proper configuration with acceptable overhead. The
evaluation does not show a single case that prevents a produc-
tive usage of Apate.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented Apate, a Linux Kernel Module for
hardening High Interaction Honeypots. Apate works on a
system call level, is able to log, block and manipulate these
calls, and uses an easy to use yet powerful configuration
language. The evaluation shows that Apate has a moderate
performance overhead and can be used in productive honeypot
systems. Apate is also stealthy enough for most common usage
scenarios. Overall, Apate is an ideal basis and important build-
ing block for upcoming High Interaction Honeypot Systems.
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